

RECORDED

MEMORANDUM OF GOVERNOR STEVENSON
PROPOSING SOLUTION THROUGH SECURITY COUNCIL ARRANGEMENTS

I won't review the negotiations to date with which you are generally familiar.

Unless there is some break from Moscow or Havana--

I think the situation is deadlocked, and I suggest trying to conclude the transaction with the Russians to enable us to get into contact with Cuba through the OAS or directly. Realizing that the Soviets may not be able to control Cuba, I suggest consideration as a contingency of a formula for terminating the present transaction somewhat as follows:

1. If the Soviets will remove the IL-28 bombers and give us some means of verification (fuselages at sea) and formal assurance (in the Security Council) that all nuclear warheads for missiles and air nuclear bombs have been removed, and
2. If the Soviets will give us some means (through the five Latin countries having diplomatic relations, for example) verify compliances above ex post facto (I assume our reconnaissance will also verify without any agreement by the Soviets or Cubans), and
3. If the Soviets and Cuba will give us a formal public promise (in the Security Council) not to reintroduce these weapons into Cuba,
4. We will call off the quarantine and give Cuba the formal guarantee (in the Security Council) against invasion and ask other Latin states to do likewise.

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State Dept. 8/10/73.....
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
B. D. [Signature] DMS, Date 9/15/74

The open question then would be: reciprocal guarantees by Cuba and other Latins and the United States against interference, subversion, sabotage, support for attacks, etc., together with some system of mutual verification by international inspection. This should be worked out through the OAS, if the other Latin states think it worthwhile.

Adlai E. Stevenson

~~SECRET~~

ANNOTATED COPY FOLLOWS

File with
minutes
Nov. 12 1962
200-24

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF GOVERNOR STEVENSON
PROPOSING SOLUTION TO CUBA SECURITY COUNCIL ARRANGEMENTS

I won't review the negotiations to date with which you are generally familiar.

Unless there is some break from Moscow or Havana--

I think the situation is deadlocked, and I suggest trying to conclude the transaction with the Russians to enable us to get into contact with Cuba through the U.S. or directly. Realizing that the Soviets may not be able to control Cuba, I suggest consideration as a contingency of a formula for terminating the present transaction somewhat as follows:

1. If the Soviets will remove the Il-28 bombers and give us some means of verification (fuselages at sea) and formal assurance (in the Security Council) that all nuclear threats for missiles and air nuclear bombs have been removed, and
2. If the Soviets will give us some means (through the five Latin countries having diplomatic relations, for example) verify compliances above ~~as best facts~~ (I assume air reconnaissance will also verify without any agreement by the Soviets or Cubans), and
3. If the Soviets and Cuba will give us a formal public promise (in the Security Council) not to reintroduce these weapons into Cuba,
4. We will call off the quarantine and give Cuba the formal guarantees (in the Security Council) against invasion and ask other Latin states to do likewise.

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11/12/62 10:15 AM 13
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 3(d) (2) (b)
RECORDED: 11/12/62 10:15 AM 13

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The open question then would be: reciprocal guarantees by Cuba and other Latin and the United States against interference, subversion, sabotage, support for attacks, etc., together with some system of mutual verification by international inspection. This should be worked out through the OAS, if the other Latin states think it worthwhile.

Adlai E. Stevenson

END OF TAPING